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Abstract 
In November 1980, voters in Los Angeles County, California, approved Proposition 
A, which stipulated a one-time, three-year rollback of bus fares to 50¢. Afterwards, at 
least 35 percent of the revenues had to be used for rail construction and operation (with 
a stated emphasis on construction). The program moved forward as called for, and by the 
early 1990s the Blue Line to Long Beach was in operation. The subway and an addition-
al light rail line would both open by 1995. 
In the early 1990s, however, opponents of rail began a campaign to discredit the 
program using premature, distorted, and sometimes simply false information about rails 
effectiveness. Embarrassed by construction problems and confused by internal issues, the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) found it difficult to defend the new rail system. In 
1994, a suit was filed by the Bus Riders Union, a small group of bus riders. In 1996, even 
though most of the basic assertions of the suit were proven to have been either premature 
or false, the MTA agreed to a settlement it is now trying to live up to. 
In truth, the MTA fully supported the bus system well after falling ridership would 
have called for service cutbacks. The number of buses in service stayed high, the bus-
miles of service dropped far less than ridership, and the number of empty bus seats 
actually rose. The bus system lacked for neither operatingfunds nor subsidies. Even the 
average fare paid by the transit user (in constant 1999 dollars) changed very little 
since the early 1980s. Whatever the reasons for the slide in bus ridership, the rail sys-
tem cannot be blamed. 
The new rail system continues to grow in importance. Less than 10 years after the 
Vol. 3, No. 2, 2000 
2 Journal of Public Transportation 
Blue Line was inaugurated, the two light rail lines, the still incomplete subway, and the 
Los Angeles portion of the regional Metro/ink commuter rail system together carry 11 
percent of all MTA transit riders and 22 percent of its passenger-miles. Rail is also prov-
ing to be faster than the bus option even including a bus-to-rail transfer. And rails oper-
ating cost effectiveness, already better than that of the bus, keeps improving. 
Introduction 
This article evaluates certain arguments used in Los Angeles to couch the 
bus system as a victim of a misguided rail program. It is not to discredit buses. 
The bus system will continue to be the workhorse transit mode in Los Angeles 
and nationwide; no other system provides the needed area coverage within a 
large urbanized area. Two-thirds of its riders rank the bus service as good or 
very good (MTA Service Planning and Research Program Reports), a strong 
indication that it is doing its job well. However, the bus system will never be the 
single solution for transit in Los Angeles. Twice in 10 years (1980 and 1990), 
citizens of Los Angeles agreed and voted funding for a major rail component of 
the transit system. 
Transit in Los Angeles during the Past 20 Years 
Twenty years ago, the first major oil crisis broke with events in Iran. 
Gasoline prices soared to $2.45 (in 1999 dollars), adding to commuters' ongoing 
frustrations with increasing traffic congestion. Proposition A went to the voters 
in November 1980 promising an eventual rail system in specifically-named cor-
ridors to motorists and a three-year, one-shot fare reduction with ongoing fare 
subsidies thereafter to bus riders. To many people's surprise, it passed. The bal-
lot language of Proposition A leaves no doubt it was conceived by its authors and 
put forth as substantially a rail construction measure. The MTA has no choice 
whether or not to build rail transit. In essence, it may be criticized for how it 
builds rail lines, not that it builds them. 
In mid-1982, after a legal challenge, the provisions of the measure were 
begun with implementation of the mandated three-year rollback of transit fares. 
Fares went from $1.43 to 80¢ during this period. (All fares are in 1999 dollars.) 
MTA's I bus ridership, which had been slipping, went up 40 percent. This was a 
phenomenal achievement. Unfortunately, the three-year fare rollback period 
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ended in 1985 in conformance with Proposition A, and the base adult fare rose 
again to $1.25. Bus ridership fell 10 percent immediately, and continued to 
slide year-by-year until 1996 when it bottomed out 8 percent below its 1982 
level. (It has since climbed above that level.) However, the spin-off of many 
Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) San Gabriel Valley bus 
lines to Foothill Transit and a number of its commuter bus lines to Los Angeles 
Department of Transportation (LAD OT) in the early 1990s caused some of the 
MTA's bus ridership loss. Obviously, the new rail services diverted some other 
bus riders to rail as well. MTA transit ridership in 1998 was 17 percent above 
its 1982 level if one adds back these "lost" riders.2 Non-MTA transit ridership 
in Los Angeles County has grown 23 percent since the early 1980s. 
Although MTA bus ridership kept slipping from 1986 onward, the amount 
of bus service supplied did not. The operating budgets between 1986 and 1990 
averaged 30 percent more (in equivalent dollars) than they had before the roll-
back period. Similarly, the maximum number of buses in service and the annu-
al bus-miles of service stayed at their all-time highs. The needed additional 
subsidies were made available. By the early 1990s, with the generally weak 
southern California economy, this policy simply became financially untenable, 
and the MTA started trimming the oversupply of bus service to reflect the far 
lower demand. 
Meanwhile, the MTA started rail construction in 1985. Construction dol-
lars came from the 35 percent Proposition A allocation earmarked for this 
work. The 22-mile Blue Line between downtown Los Angeles and Long Beach 
opened in 1990, the Red Line subway opened five stations in 1992 and now 
extends through downtown Los Angeles to Hollywood, and the 20-mile grade-
separated Green Line between Norwalk and El Segundo opened in 1995. The 
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA), which by law is com-
posed of the transportation agencies of all five counties it serves, opened its 
first lines in 1992 and now operates a six-line, 416-mile system. Because 60 
percent of the service is in Los Angeles County, MTA's share of the operating 
subsidy is also about 60 percent. 3 Rail ridership has gone from nothing in 1990 
to 46 million annual trips nine years later ( 1999). 
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Arguments against Rail 
Over the past decade, critics have levied attacks on Los Angeles 's rail pro-
gram. Early on it was an easy target. In 1996, the Reason Foundation printed its 
Ten Transit Myths: Misperceptions about Rail Transit in Los Angeles and the 
Nation. It used 1993 data to criticize the Los Angeles program and rail, in gen-
eral, nationwide. The report attacked a six-year-old light rail line based on its 
performance through its third year in operation, and a three-year-old subway 
segment based on activity during its first year, and was at the least unfair. But it 
accomplished its goal of confusion and gave the media the controversy it seems 
to need. In 1995, after a fare increase, a small group, presumptuously calling 
itself the Bus Riders Union, filed a suit in federal court alleging the rail system 
harmed the civil rights of the lower income bus commuters. They wanted to turn 
Proposition A into a bus-only measure. Yet, ironically, had Proposition A actu-
ally been a bus-only measure, it almost certainly would have failed. 
The discussion that follows takes six of these anti-rail arguments and eval-
uates them. The basic source of information comes from the Federal Transit 
Administration's (FTA) National Transit Database, an annual compilation of 
transit statistics from FY 1979 through 1997 (the last year published). For 1998 
data, the MTA's submission to the FTA is used. Most of the dollar figures used 
in the report have been converted to 1999 dollars using Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' conversion factors to make comparisons between years easier. 
Argument 1: 
Reality: 
Rail was built for and is used by suburban whites. 
The rail system was built for and is used overwhelmingly by 
minority and transit-dependent riders. 
The three MTA rail lines were built, in large measure, to serve the needs 
of transit-dependent communities. As one would expect from the areas it 
serves, the rail system is used overwhelmingly by minority, transit-dependent 
riders. This is confirmed by the results of a series of onboard passenger sur-
veys shown in Table I. {MTA Service Planning and Research Program 
Reports: FY 96-97 MTA On-Board Passenger Survey; 1998 Blue Line 
Passenger Survey; 1998 Green Line Passenger Survey; and 1998 Red Line 
Passenger Survey.) 
Vol. 3, No. 2, 2000 
Journal of Public Transportation 5 
MTA bus ridership is 88.5 percent minority and rail ridership, 84 percent 
(weighted). To say the bus system carries a higher percentage of minorities is 
splitting hairs. While rail passengers do have marginally more household 
income and slightly higher access to an automobile, they by no means 
approach affluent. (Now that the Red Line serves the Vermont Avenue corridor, 
the rail percentage will probably be higher than 84%.) 
As is typical of commuter rail serving outlying areas, Metrolink's house-
hold incomes average $65,000 and car availability 86 percent, both clearly sep-
arating its ridership economically from other rail riders. Its ridership is 40 per-
cent minority. Like the other lines, however, Metrolink's ridership generally 
reflects the demographics of the corridors it serves, and the outlying counties 
have lower minority populations. Those counties also pay all costs for their 
lines. 
Table 1 
Results of 1997 MTA Passenger Surveys (%) 
Question Category Blue Line Green Line Red Line Bus System 
l. Gender Male 50.l 52.5 52.7 44.3 
Female 49.9 47.5 47.3 55.7 
2. Ethnicity White 11.0 14.1 25.l 12.5 
African American 31.3 32.9 20.2 22.1 
Hispanic 47.9 38.9 39.6 52.2 
Asian 5.7 8.8 11.3 8.6 
American Indian l.4 2.2 l.2 1.1 
Other 2.6 3.1 2.7 3.5 
3. Income <$15,000 52.0 40.l 33.0 69.2 
$15,000-$35,000 27.8 19.5 24.6 20.6 
$35,001-$75,000 15.9 21.2 26.8 8.8 
4. Was a vehicle available? >$75,000 4.3 9.2 15.6 l.4 
33.1 36.7 41.8 20.2 
Source: CATS (1999). 
Argument 2: The increases in MTA transit fares caused by the rail pro-
gram have hurt the poorer and minority bus riders dispro-
portionately. 
Reality: In 1999 dollars, the average bus fare has changed very little 
since 1979. 
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Much has been made of the assumed rise in transit fares over the last two 
decades. Although the adult base fare has increased from 50¢ in 1985 to $1 .35 
today, less than one-quarter of all riders pay this fu ll fare (MTA Service 
Planning and Research Program Reports). The average fare collected per pas-
senger is typically fa r less because of the discounts inherent in the monthly 
pass, school fares, elderly, and handicapped passes, and now weekly passes and 
token discounts. Figure I plots in 1999 dollars both the adu lt base fare (upper 
line) and the average revenue per passenger (lower line). Several things are 
clear. First, the average revenue per passenger is fa r less than the adult base 
fare, averaging about half as much. Second, the tlu·ee-year fare rollback period 
shows up as the anomaly it was. (The sharp jumps in the chart are base fare 
adjustments, for example, to $1.10 in 1988 and to $ I .35 in 1995.) 
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Figure 1. Adult base fares and average fares in 1999 dollars 
The chart also shows that the average revenue per rider has been very con-
sistent over the past 20 years. By design or luck, MTA fare increases have 
tracked inflation over the last 20 years, just above and below 60¢. The period-
ic fare increases have surprisingly not added to the burden of the lower income 
transit rider. 
Argument 3: The rail system has diverted needed financial resources fi'om 
the bus system. 
Reality: The financial needs oftlze bus system were not compromised 
by the rail program and were being met well after t/zey slzould 
have been reduced. 
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Figure 2 depicts annual bus operating expendi tures (upper line) and corre-
sponding subsidies required to cover what fa re revenues do not (lower line), 
both in 1999 dollars. The chart clearly shows that the level of bus operating dol-
lars dropped very slightly after the fare rollback ended in 1985 and held amaz-
ingly steady until 1995. But the needed subsidies to fund this level of operations 
were also available well into the 1990s. In fact, the subsidy levels for bus oper-
ations increased steadily from 1989 to 1994 to make up for the dropping fare 
revenues. Bus service levels also remained high during this period. 
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Figure 2. Bus operating costs and subsidies 
The gap between the level of service being supplied and the service being 
consumed, however, continued to widen. Figure 3 shows the MTA bus ridership 
over time. In spite of heavy funding, ridership steadi ly slipped from 450 million 
annual bus trips in 1986 to 378 million in 1994, a 16 percent drop. By this time, 
with sales tax revenues fa ll ing with the weak southern California economy, the 
MTA had no choice but to bring expenses and subsidies more in line with rider-
ship. If anything, it could be faulted for not having done so sooner. 
The rail construction effort began in earnest in 1985 and continued there-
after, especially until 1995 while the light rail li nes were being bui lt. Both were 
100 percent locally funded. There is nothing to suggest that, duri ng this heavi-
est period of capital outlay for the rail program, funding for the bus system was 
in any way compromised. 
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Figure 3. Annual bus ridership 
Argument 4: The diversio11 of money to rail has led to less bus service, 
fallillg ridership, and crowding of buses. 
Reality: The overall quality of bus service increased with the rail pro-
gram. 
This section addresses key indicators of bus service quality: maximum 
number of buses in revenue service, total revenue bus-miles, and average bus 
passenger loads. 
The maximum number of buses in revenue service is usually the total 
number of buses in the afternoon peak. Whi le not a defini tive indicator of ser-
vice quality, it is an important and recognized one. During the fare rol lback 
period, the number of buses in revenue service increased to 2,073 to carry 
increasing ridership. The maximum number of buses dropped slightly after 
1989, but the MTA has fielded a very consistent number of buses since. 
Recently, the number of buses approached the number in service during the 
fare ro llback period when bus ridership was 40 percent higher! 
Similarly, revenue bus-miles averaged 91 million per year during the fare 
rollback period. They actually rose slightly between 1986 and 1989, then 
Vol. 3, No. 2, 2000 
Journal of Public Tra11sponmio11 9 
dipped in stages to 79 million by 1995. (Some of those "lost" bus-miles result-
ed from the spin-off of bus lines to Foothill Transit and LADOT in the early to 
mid-I 990s.) The drop in bus-miles was less than 15 percent from what it aver-
aged during the fare rollback period, one-third the drop in ridership. 
Figure 4 plots the average number of passengers per bus for the 
1979-1998 period. Buses usually start their routes with few people and end 
with few people. In the midd le of the route, there may be times when the bus 
is crowded. Fewer passengers means it is probable that there would be fewer of 
those crowded times. Lower average loads indicate that such loading condi-
tions have decreased. The typical bus has about 44 seats; a loading of 22 means 
that, on average, half of the seats are occupied. 
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Figure 4. Average bus loading 
During the 1983-1985 period, the number of passengers per bus rose to 
just under 26, but over the next IO years the average dropped to 20, which is 
substantial. Contrary to what has been assumed by the Bus Riders Union, the 
number of seats available on the bus system increased during the period of 
maximum rai l capita l expenditures. Can the rai l system take credit for less 
crowded buses? Probably not entirely- but the rai l system cannot be blamed 
for increased crowding that did not occur on the bus system. 
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These three indicators of the amount and quality of the bus service sup-
plied paint a picture of a bus system that, in spite of falling ridership, kept 
buses and service levels high, which resulted in fewer passengers carried per 
bus. But if the amount of service being provided was holding steady while bus 
ridership was falling, what was happening to the cost of carrying each passen-
ger? It climbed in the 10 years after 1986, from $1.58 to $1.92. The cost to 
carry one passenger one mile rose from 3 7 ¢ to 51 ¢ over the same period ( again, 
all figures in 1999 dollars). 
Argument 5: The rail system is underutilized, not cost effective, and takes 
more than its share of funding. 
Reality: The rail system is well used, is more cost effective than the 
bus system, and takes its fair share of subsidies. 
Although the rail system in Los Angeles is still limited, unfinished, and 
new, it has done a remarkable job attracting riders. The Blue Line, which at 10 
years is the oldest rail line in the region, attracts 59,000 daily riders, the most 
of any single light rail line in the country. The Green Line carries 25,000 rid-
ers each day after 4 years of operations. Its ridership is greater than the com-
bined ridership of all buses on the El Monte Busway after 25 years of that ser-
vice. The Red Line, which has only begun to assert its potential since its June 
1999 extension to Hollywood and Vine, carries 59,000 riders each day. And 
Metrolink, the 416-mile, five-county commuter rail system carries 29,000 trips 
each day, 90 percent of whom travel within or to and from Los Angeles County. 
Together, the system carries 165,000 daily trips or 11 percent of all MTA trips 
and over 22 percent of all transit passenger-miles of travel.4 
But comparing just the number of trips does not give the full picture 
because many bus trips are 2 to 5 miles long, the average being 3. 7 miles. 
While on the rail lines, the average trips can be much longer. The average trip 
length on the light rail system is 7.1 miles, on Metrolink it is 35 miles.5 A 3-
mile trip is quite different from a 35-mile trip. For example, it obviously costs 
more to take a passenger 35 miles than 3.7 miles. Comparing only the cost per 
trip for these two trips is very misleading. The use of "passenger-mile"-one 
passenger transported l mile-is a better way to compare these quite different 
trip lengths. 
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"Passenger-mile" is also useful in assessing the importance of the trans-
port mode. Consider all the local trips cars make each day on Los Angeles 's 
surface streets, add them all up, and this number swamps the number of trips 
cars make each day on freeways. Based on number of trips, clearly surface 
streets are more important than freeways. But if you look at vehicle-miles (pas-
senger-miles), the freeway carries 43 percent of all vehicle-miles of travel each 
day within Los Angeles County (Federal Highway Administration, 1998). Now 
which is more important? (The answer, of course, is neither. Surface streets 
handle very many short trips well, the freeways fewer long trips well.) 
That the rail transit system, as skeletal as it is, carries 22.4 percent of the 
MTA's total passenger-miles of travel is quite an accomplishment. The freeway 
system carries about 20 percent of all auto trips and 43 percent of all vehicle-
miles of travel; the new rail system carries IO percent of the transit trips and 22 
percent of the transit passenger-miles of travel. In short, it is already half as 
important to Los Angeles 's transit system as the region's freeway system is to 
its streets and roads system. 
Does the rail system consume more than its "fair share" of operating sub-
sidies? The answer is a qualified "no," as can be seen in Table 2. Overall, the 
rail system carries fewer passengers than its percentage of subsidy, but more 
passenger-miles than its share. The Metrolink commuter rail system especially 
requires far less subsidy than its contribution to total passenger-miles of trav-
el. The light rail component of the system (made up of the Blue and Green 
Lines) carries more passenger-miles than its percentage of subsidy, but less rid-
ership. The Red Line is not yet carrying its own, but that is understandable 
since this will be its first year to Hollywood and does not yet reach the San 
Fernando Valley. Within the next several years, it will be carrying more pas-
sengers and passenger-miles of travel than its share of subsidies. 
Is the rail system more cost effective than the buses? Figures 5 and 6 look 
at indicators of operating cost eff ectiveness6 over the past decade. They show 
that the light rail system has steadily improved in cost effectiveness while the 
bus system has slipped. The cost per passenger-mile reflects the large differ-
ence in average trip lengths between the two modes. The figures also show a 
linear, computer-generated trend line to smooth out the year-to-year variations 
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Table 2 
Operating Expenses by Mode (1998) 
Mode Budgeted % of Annual Boardings Annual Passenger-Miles 
Operating Subsidy Subsidy Number % Number % 
Bus $448,900,000 83.1 359,579,855 89.5 1,355,9 I 3,000 77.6 
Light Rail $45,800,000 8.5 23.883,883 5.9 68,900.000 9.7 
Subway $24.900,000 4.6 12,269,205 3.1 59,800,000 3.4 
Metrolink $20,S00,000 3.8 6,014,000 l.S 162, I 00,000 9.3 
Total Rail $91,200,000 16.9 42,723,088 10.5 390,800,000 22.4 
Total $540, I 00,000 100.0 402,167,088 100.0 I, 746,7 I 3,000 100.0 
in operating costs. These trend li nes show light ra il 's cost effectiveness steadi-
ly improving as bus costs steadily worsen. The cost per trip for each mode is 
now almost equal, the cost per passenger-mi le is now lower for the light rail 
system and is one-third less than that of the bus system. 
In FY 2000, the operating cost per passenger of the Red Line wi ll be 
almost the same as for the bus ($2.06 for the subway versus $2.03 for bus), 
although the cost per passenger-trip is sti ll higher for the subway. The main rea-
son for the latter is because the average Red Line trip is sti ll two-thirds the 
length of the bus (2.6 mi les versus 3.7 mi les). Both Red Line indicators will 
drop significantly when the line opens to North Hollywood in June 2000 and a 
large number of longer trips fl oods the line. 
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Figure 6. Operating cost per passenger-mile 
Bus advocates take the rail capita l costs and calculate what each passen-
ger-trip should be charged. This compares apples with oranges: the capital cost 
of a faster, higher capacity, cost-efficient system versus a system designed to 
provide many short trips at slower speeds over many "free" streets. Wh ile the 
ari thmetic may be fau ltless in such a comparison, the understanding of the 
value obtained is lacking. For example, a car moving over a new freeway could 
be calculated as having a much worse cost effectiveness than a car making the 
same trip over existing "free" streets. One could even argue the freeway is a 
waste of money by comparison, if the value of the freeway-its higher speed, 
capacity, and safety- is ignored. 
There have been studies in the past comparing equivalent systems-
busways and rail lines serving similar areas-which clearly demonstrate the 
better value of the rail service. The earliest one was in 1972 and compared the 
Shirley Busway with the Lindenwold Rail Line (Vuchic and Stanger 1972). A 
good candidate for another such compari son would be the $800-mil lion, 10-
mile Harbor Freeway Transitway. It is 3 miles west of the Blue Line and also 
serves south-central Los Angeles and communities to the south. Operating now 
for five years, the Harbor Freeway Transitway carries about 2,000 transit riders 
a day, 3 .S percent of the Blue Line total. 
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Argument 6: The rail system is not convenient and is slower than the bus 
to use, and forcing a transfer is unfair. 
Reality: The rail system is faster than taking the bus, even with a 
tra11sfe1: 
There is a continuing misperception that the MTA's rail system is slower 
than the bus system. It is not. The National Transit Database's summary on the 
MTA shows that average revenue speeds of rail modes are far more than that 
of the bus fleet (National Transit Database 1997). (See Figure 7 .) 
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But what happens if a transit rider must transfer to the rai l system? Is the 
full trip still faster than staying on the bus? The sense that transferring to Red 
Line is slower comes from three assumptions. The first is that, in downtown, 
getting to a station, descending to the platform, and waiting for the train to 
arrive takes longer than simply taking a bus. Outside downtown, the time spent 
transferring from a connecting bus to the train is assumed to take too long to 
be attractive. The final assumption is that the Red Line takes longer because 
the Red Line alignment is not direct. 
How do these assumptions stack up in the real world? To find out, sample 
door-to-door trips were field-tested starting west of Vermont Avenue (the street 
under which the Red Line travels toward Hollywood) and ending at 6th and 
Broadway in downtown Los Angeles. This is a logical trip for a typical transit-
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dependent rider living in the mid-Wilshire area who works or shops downtown. 
One alternative trip requires the user to board a bus, transfer to the Red Line, 
then walk to the eventual destination. In the other alternative, the rider boards 
the bus, continues downtown, then walks to work. Depending on where one 
lives, bus routes #20, #21, and #22 are available on Wilshire; # 14 on Beverly; 
#4 on Santa Monica; and #2 on Sunset. Each of these bus routes proceeds 
directly downtown. Most of the trips taken were midday trips, which gives the 
bus trip an advantage. 
None of the above assumptions proved valid. Heading toward downtown, 
the time to transfer to the Red Line is long-up to 15 minutes in the worst case. 
But the speed of the train makes up for any time spent waiting. Returning from 
downtown, one realizes that buses also have headways; walking to the right bus 
stop and waiting for the bus to arrive often is as long or longer than walking to 
the closest subway entrance and waiting for the train. This wait time hurts the 
slower bus trip. The average extra time it took the bus to make the trip in the 
eastbound direction was 4.25 minutes, or 16 percent. In the westbound direc-
tion, the average extra time for the bus trip was 17 minutes, or 55 percent. 
While this survey is not scientific, its results are consistent among the trips and 
consistent with what one could derive from timetables and standard wait times, 
and should not be surprising. 
Conclusions 
It is not clear why the MTA's bus system continued to lose ridership even 
after the end of the fare rollback period of 1983-1985. The MTA actually had 
more buses in revenue service during the peak periods. Those buses ran the 
same number of revenue bus-miles through the 1980s and the eventual drop in 
revenue service miles was one-third that of bus ridership. The number of empty 
seats in buses overall actually rose between 1986 and 1995, which almost cer-
tainly meant less crowding. Operating expenses continued high as did the sub-
sidies needed to keep all this extra service continuing. And most amazingly, the 
average transit rider paid almost the same fare in spite of periodic fare increas-
es. Other, smaller operators in Los Angeles County gained substantial bus rid-
ership during this same period. 
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Nothing in the record supports the contention that the financial needs of 
the rail system caused the quality of bus service to deteriorate. It would have 
been nice if the lower fare in the 1983-1985 period could have been sustained, 
but it could not have under the rules of Proposition A approved by the voters. 
Nor can one defend the contentions that the fledgling rail system is used 
only by affluent suburbanites, is little used, or is not carrying its fair share of 
the transit load. In 2000, it will carry more than 11 percent of all MTA transit 
trips and more than 22 percent of all its passenger-miles of travel. And it is 
doing so more cost effectively than are the buses with no more than its fair 
share of operating subsidies. 
Endnotes 
1. Until 1992, the agencies involved were the SCRTD and the Los Angeles 
County Transportation Commission. In 1992, they merged to the LACMTA. 
In most cases, it is easier to use the MTA as the generic label. 
2. This assumes that ridership on the lines spun off the Foothill Transit and 
LADOT would have increased as much under MTA operations. 
3. Unless otherwise noted, Metrolink figures presented in this article are only 
for Los Angeles County. 
4. The SCRRA Fiscal Year 1999/00 Approved Budget assumes that a conserv-
ative 60 percent of total passenger-miles are in Los Angeles County (page 
31 ). See also the LACMTA Adopted Budget for Fiscal Year ending June 30, 
2000 (page 39). The Blue Line now has 10 years of operations under its belt 
and can be fairly assessed; it is, however, too early to give a fair assessment 
of the Red Line's performance. The Green Line is also still growing. 
However, Green Line and Blue Line statistics are combined in the National 
Transit Database statistics, making it difficult to keep them separately. 
5. Because the Red Line is still relatively short, its average trip length is only 
2.6 miles. 
6. Bus advocates often state that not only is rail more expensive to build, but is 
also more expensive (less cost effective) to operate. This article looks only 
at the latter contention. 
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